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Abstract 
Collective intentions form the basis of the social world and represent a 
mode of experience overlooked in some phenomenological analysis: we-
intentionality. Some argue that the subject of intentionality is the intending 
subject, but phenomenology is committed to intentionality in essence being 
something restricted to individual subjectivities.  
The intending subject, the conscious subject, is not equivalent to the 
subject of intention or subject matter of acts of consciousness, i. e. it is not 
the syntactical subject referenced in and through an intentional act. Hans 
Bernhard Schmid disagrees; here I present the case for subjective individu-
alism with respect to collective intentionality and respond to his arguments 
for collectivism. 
Resumen 
Las intenciones colectivas son la base del mundo social y representan 
un modo de la experiencia que ha sido dejado de lado en el análisis feno-
menológico: la intencionalidad-nosotros. Aunque algunos plantean que el 
sujeto de la intencionalidad es el sujeto que intenta, la fenomenología está 
comprometida con la idea de una intencionalidad en esencia restingida a 
subjetividades individuales.  
El sujeto que intenta, el sujeto consciente, no es equivalente al sujeto 
de la intención o del contenido de los actos de conciencia; no es el sujeto 
sintáctico al que hace referencia el acto intencional. Hans Bernhard Schmid 
difiere. En este trabajo sustento el individualismo subjetivo con respecto a 
la intencionalidad colectiva y respondo a los argumentos en favor del colec-
tivismo presentados por Schmid.  
                                                 
1 This material is also part of the author’s dissertation, Intersubjectivity: A Phenomenol-
ogical Contribution to Collective Intentionality, approved by the faculty of the department of 
philosophy at the University of Buffalo, State University of New York, as meeting part of the 
requirements for a doctoral degree in philosophy in May of 2010. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, I respond to Hans Bernhard Schmid’s criticisms of subjec-
tive individualism. Subjective individualism is the position that all collective 
intentions are intentions had by individuals. Collective intentions are inten-
tional states in a plural form, as distinct from a singular form. That is, col-
lective intentions are in the form we-intend, and not the form I-intend. The 
paper begins by reviewing David Carr’s superb analysis of plural subjects. 
This serves as a point of context according to which phenomenology can 
more robustly interface with the collective intentionality literature. It should 
be noted, in addition, that Schmid too has a strong background in phe-
nomenology. The second part of the paper reviews Schmid’s arguments and 
outlines my response.  
I 
Everyday experience is intersubjectively situated; one encounters others 
as conscious experiencing subjects in their own right. One has experiences 
of others as well as experiences with others. Some experiences are in a we-
mode, where one describes them accurately in the manner of we did or ex-
perienced such and such. Some of these experiences are not reducible to 
singular intentional descriptions without a loss of meaning, i. e. not reduci-
ble to what I experience and you experience as individuals. That is to say 
that some experiences with others are such that one cannot describe them 
fully where one formulates the description as you and I did, saw, heard, 
experienced, etc., x, in distinction from describing them in the manner of 
we x. Individually oriented descriptions leave open coincidental experiences, 
and sometimes one uses “we” to describe cases of coincidental individual 
experiences, experiences that are more congruent with one another than 
experienced as together. Experiencing something as part of a whole, e. g. 
as a member of a team or in partnership with another cannot be adequately 
described without regarding the we-mode2. Such cases represent the phe-
nomena of plural subjects.  
                                                 
2 It is less that something is assumed here, and more that one is focused on how the 
phenomena are to be described, if given rich and adequate description to more than a super-
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In an experience that is essentially in a we-mode, i. e. a plural subject 
experience, one’s acts of consciousness directly reference others: 
The establishment of the we in common perception is the simplest form 
of what Husserl calls the Vergemeinschaftung der Monaden3: when two sub-
jects confront one another and stand in relation to the same objects they 
form, to that extent, a rudimentary community that can itself be considered 
as performing an act (cogitamus) through “its” diverse (and in this case si-
multaneous) presentations4.  
Collective intentional or intersubjective moments of experience, in-
stances where there is a non-reducible we, can be understood as founda-
tional for higher order intersubjective meanings. The broader social world 
and the meanings constituted in it are based in shared experiential founda-
tions. This does not imply that there is strong collectivity, i. e. that collec-
tives themselves are subjectivities. The “we” as subject of experience, the 
“rudimentary community”, is often referred to in contemporary literature as 
the plural subject. David Carr states, “the community is a ‘community of 
                                                 
ficial appearance. An example presents itself to me as I am working over this material. Out-
side my window, the park across the way, there are three individuals playing Frisbee. One 
cannot play Frisbee by oneself, as it is a game that requires more than one subject. One 
could certainly throw a Frisbee alone, and chase after it themself. But, one is not playing at 
Frisbee at all if that is the case, much as one is not playing tennis is one practices against a 
backboard or playing baseball if one takes batting practice in a batting cage. At best, one is 
isolating an individual component of the larger activity, one that requires others. One might 
say even that such practice is best when it can simulate the presence of another in absence: 
when the deflection off the backboard lacks predictability, simulating another’s return to 
some extent or the pitching machine’s delivery varies based upon how the seems of the ball 
hit the spinning wheel, leaving indeterminate the specific behavior of the pitch one faces. 
While on one level, it would be to commit no violence to say the three are each individually 
tossing the Frisbee back and forth, this ignores the larger phenomena by reducing it to its 
participants and their individuated manners of relation. In other words, playing Frisbee, that 
which binds their actions together falls away. In more complex cases, one might point out 
that a corporation is has powers and characteristics that none of its individual members 
alone has, and that the activities of the corporation require and are constituted through the 
working together of the individual members and the explicitly and implicitly codified practices 
that inform or direct their individual activities as part of that whole.  
3 Reference is to the title of § 55 of Cartesian Meditations, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1999, 
translation by Dorion Cairns: Cairns renders this “Establishment of the community of mo-
nads”, Carr is clearly not happy with how Cairns renders Vergemeinschaftung, opting for 
something more like: “Monads effecting (entering into and thereby constituting) community”. 
Carr’s right to emphasize the active nature of this “community”. A further alternative could 
be to think of Husserl’s discussion as of the communalization of subjects or subjects entering 
into community or commerce with one another as the establishment of common ground. 
Italicization of those terms with shared root sense in the previous sentence is for purposeful 
emphasis.  
4 David Carr, “The ‘Fifth Meditation’ and Husserl’s Cartesianism”, Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research vol. 34, 1 (1973), p. 30. 
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monads, which we designate as transcendental intersubjectivity’. It is tran-
scendental because it makes ‘transcendentally possible the being of a 
world’, in this case the intersubjective world”5. “The ‘communities’ of which 
Husserl speaks, beginning with the simplest perceptual encounter between 
two persons, are available to me only insofar as I participate in them 
through my communication with other persons”6. For phenomenology inten-
tionality’s socially constitutive role is what differentiates the cultural or so-
cial dimensions of the world from the natural world and their respective 
categories of meaning. It is clear that an individual subject alone is inade-
quate for those meanings that are fundamentally social in nature. Adequate 
analyses of specific social objects ought to reference those communities 
constituting of the object with the meaning that it bears in experience. “It 
is, as we have seen, the cogitamus which is the starting point of intersub-
jective phenomenology”7. The intersubjective world is not premised on “I’s”, 
but “we’s”8. Intersubjectively situated meanings are only intelligible in rela-
tion to pluralities of subjects, that is, they receive their sense constitutions 
through intersubjective exchange or in intersubjective contexts, not by an 
individual alone9. Collective intentionality need not be understood as sub-
                                                 
5 Idem; Carr quoting from Husserl, op. cit., pp. 129f / 157f. All citations from this text of 
Husserl refer to the pagination of the English edition first, and the German pagination sec-
ond. 
6 Ibidem, p. 33. 
7 Idem. 
8 To assuage my realist readers who may worry about an odd multiplication of the 
world, allow me to offer a disambiguation. There is but one world in the physical sense of 
that term, that sense of world is what is often used in the natural sciences. When I use 
‘world’ or ‘worlds’ where the plural use makes sense, I refer to world in the phenomenologi-
cal sense: a system or network of meanings. This is the sense used when one says of some-
one that “they are in their own world” or of a culture distinct from one’s own that “it is a 
whole other world”. Given that there are subjectively and culturally idiosyncratic meanings, it 
is only natural that one can speak of worlds in this sense. I do not take the plurality of phe-
nomenological worlds to entail anything about the metaphysics of the natural world, though I 
do take it to have implications relating to the socially constituted objects, categories, mean-
ings, etc.  
9 Elsewhere I have argued that one need not reify intersubjective wholes, i. e. make 
them into subjectivities in their own right, in order for this to happen. The systemic level 
interactions between individual subjects proper is what gives rise to these types of phenom-
ena. As such, I would argue Schmid’s emphasis on relationality (cfr. Hans Bernhard Schmid, 
“Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?”, Philosophical Explorations vol. VI, 3 (2003) 201-218; 
Idem, Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Rationality-in-Relations”, in David Koepsell / Laurence S. 
Moss (eds.), John Searle’s Ideas About Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms and Reconstruc-
tions, Oxford, Blackwell, 2003, pp. 67-101; Idem, “Rationalizing Coordination: Towards a 
Stronger Conception of Collective Intentionality”, in Mark D. White / Barbara Montero (eds.), 
Economics and the Mind, London, Routledge, 2006 (used the copy available at 
http://cipp.unibas.ch/index.php?id=5416&no_cache=1&file=636&uid=5128)is correct at 
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stantively different than intentionality in the singular, “it is based on the 
cogitamus in just the same way that individual phenomenology is based in 
the cogito”10. Given the locus and limitation of consciousness per se to the 
individual subject of experience and intentionality’s intrinsic origin in con-
sciousness, it is individuals who perform the act of intentionality with refer-
ence to the cogitamus, the plural subject, and not the cogitamus itself. The 
grammatical subject (the subject of syntax) does not properly speaking in-
tend anything itself. The intending subject, the conscious subject, is not 
equivalent to the subject of intention or subject matter of acts of conscious-
ness, i. e. it is not the syntactical subject referenced in and through an in-
tentional act.  
Carr observes that many analytic and phenomenological philosophers 
agree that “it is to the I as an individual subject or person, rather than to 
any sort of plurality, that intentionality properly belongs”11. This individual-
ism of intentionality is often paired with or seen as an obvious conclusion of 
definitions of intentionality. For instance, Galen Strawson’s view that the 
concrete phenomenon of intentionality is “essentially mental and indeed es-
sentially experiential (conscious) phenomenon”12. That is, “we can think 
about things. We can target, hit, refer to, mean, intend an object, present 
or absent, concrete or not, in thought”13. Take also Searle’s claim that: “In-
tentionality is that feature of the mind by which mental states are directed 
at, or are about or of, or refer to, or aim at, states of affairs in the world”14. 
What is not clear is how this connects to individuals. This might seem to 
preclude by fiat other possibilities. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi illumi-
nate why it is that phenomenologists connect these two things. “To the ex-
                                                 
root, though I find his way of thinking about and framing the consequences of the relational-
ity of subjects with one another and the intentional achievements expressed in and through 
such interactions to be problematic.  
10 David Carr, op. cit., p. 34. 
11 David Carr, “Cogitamus Ergo Sumus: The Intentionality of the First-Person Plural”, 
Monist vol. 69, 4 (1986), p. 523. 
12 Galen Strawson, “Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries”,  
in David Woodruff Smith / Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of 
Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 44. 
13 Ibidem, pp. 43f. 
14 John R. Searle, Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World, New York, 
Basic Books, 1998, pp. 54f. 
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tent that phenomenology stays with experience, it is said to take a first-
person approach. That is, the phenomenologist is concerned to understand 
the perception in terms of the meaning it has for the subject”15. “Intention-
ality is a ubiquitous character of consciousness, and as the phenomenolo-
gists put it, it means that all consciousness is about or of something”16. 
Phenomenology studies meanings from the first-personal perspective or as 
they are experienced, and all experience is someone’s experience. Phe-
nomenology’s focus on experience thus directs its analyses to examinations 
of the intentionality of consciousness. Phenomenology appeals to con-
sciousness as individually situated in embodied cognition; each conscious-
ness is someone’s consciousness. And, as Carr notes that while it is not 
controversial to refer to pluralities or groups as objects, it is rather unclear 
how one can consider them to be subjects17. Nonetheless, Carr points out 
that we do make attributions of perceptual experiences and actions to both 
individuals and groups. More importantly for phenomenology is that one can 
have experiences that are strongly identified with or attributed to a we, ex-
periences that are said to be ours, not just mine or mine and yours18. For 
example, one speaks of our travels as distinct from their own individual 
travels, or of our nuptials, our battlefield maneuvers, our chess match, etc.  
Each participant experiences the object and is aware of the others in 
such a way that he cannot possibly attribute the experience to himself 
alone. After all, it has manifold phases and perspectives, and some of these 
are not directly available to him at all. The experience in such cases, quite 
simply belongs to us; it is ours19.  
 
In such experiences one does not leave behind a first-personal point of 
view, only shifting from a singular to a plural form or plural mode of experi-
                                                 
15 Shaun Gallagher / Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, New York, Routledge, 
2008, p. 7. 
16 Idem. 
17 David Carr, “Cogitamus Ergo Sumus: The Intentionality of the First-Person Plural”, p. 
524. 
18 Ibidem, p. 525. 
19 Ibidem, p. 526. 
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encing. This works both, as Carr notes, for common perceptual experiences 
as well as common action20.  
II 
To describe the plural form of experience in relation to the individually 
situated acts of intentionality is to assert a form of individualism relative to 
the ontology of mind. In the collective intentionality literature, Hans Bern-
hard Schmid distinguishes between two separate senses of individualism: 
formal and subjective. Formal individualism is that view where the form of 
one’s intentionality is individualistic. It is the view that all intentions can 
only be in singular form, in the form of an “I intend” this or that, never in a 
plural form of a “we intend”. Schmid identifies Descartes’ view of intention-
ality as a formal individualist account.  
Descartes’ account is individualistic in that it restricts intentionality to 
the form “I intend”, “I think”. It does not seem to have crossed Descartes’ 
mind that there could be intentionality in the first person plural form, too. I 
shall refer to this version of individualism with the term “formal individual-
ism”, for what is at stake here is the form of intentionality21. 
 
The historical question as to whether or not this is a fair interpretation 
of Descartes or a caricature is here left an open question. More contempo-
raneously, Schmid identifies Bratman’s theory of collective intentionality as 
being a formal individualist view22. For Bratman, the form of relevant inten-
tions is “I intend that we J”23.  
Subjective individualism is the position that intentionality of any form, 
collective intentionality in particular, “is exclusively in the minds of individu-
                                                 
20 Ibidem, pp. 525-527. The distinction is nice, insofar as it gets at both intentionality 
proper (Intentionalität) and the sense of intent associated with goal-directed action (Ab-
sicht). This distinction, it is argued elsewhere in the dissertation, is too often glossed over or 
collapsed in English-language philosophy. 
21 Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?”, p. 205. 
22 Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Rationalizing Coordination: Towards a Stronger Conception 
of Collective Intentionality”, p. 19. 
23 Cfr. Michael E. Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
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als and independent of anything external”24. “As opposed to formal indi-
vidualism, subjective individualism does not limit intentionality to the singu-
lar form, but restricts the class of possible subjects or ‘bearers’ of intentions 
to single individuals”25. Subjective individualism, I take to be the traditional 
position of phenomenology, as well as that of John Searle. This view dis-
cussed more directly in the next section. Husserl could be seen to be criti-
cizing formal individualism where he states: “…that I can become aware of 
someone else, presupposes that not all my own modes of consciousness are 
modes of my self-consciousness”26. 
For a formal individualist, like Bratman, there are approximately three 
conditions to be met for something’s being a shared intention: 1) mutual 
responsiveness, 2) commitment to joint activity, and 3) commitment to mu-
tual support27. One of Bratman’s motivations for his individualism is shared 
with Searle: “a shared intention is not an attitude in the mind of some su-
peragent consisting literally of some fusion of the two agents. There is no 
single mind which is the fusion of your mind and mine”28. However, Brat-
man’s view departs from Searle’s on the issue of reductionism. Bratman’s 
view is that qua individualism, any collective or group intending must be 
reducible to the intentions of individuals. The reductive stance that results 
in formal individualism is reached on the grounds that shared activity re-
quires a plurality of participants, each required to be in a given range of 
mental states relative to that activity. Searle, on the other hand, is against 
reducibility on the grounds that the mental state that is a collective inten-
tion is not reducible to further individual mental states29. A collective inten-
                                                 
24 Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Rationalizing Coordination: Towards a Stronger Conception 
of Collective Intentionality”, p. 18.  
25 Idem, “Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?”, p. 205. 
26 Edmund Husserl, op. cit.,  pp. 105 / pp. 135. 
27 Michael E. Bratman, op. cit., pp. 94ff. 
28 Ibidem, p. 111; Margaret Gilbert discusses the thesis as to whether or not groups can 
be said to have beliefs under the headings “psychologism about beliefs” and “anti-
psychologism about groups”. Her use, despite being well intended, of “psychologism” is un-
fortunate as it differs from what concerned Frege and Husserl in their discussions of psy-
chologism. (Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts, Princeton-NJ, Princeton University Press, 
1992, p. 238). 
29 Bratman is careful to try and distinguish his account of shared intentions, which is in-
dividualistic and expressly reductive in spirit, from Searle’s collective intentions, Raimo 
Tuomela’s we-intentions ―Bratman may be incorrect on this point; see Raimo Tuomela, 
“Collective and Joint Intentions”, Mind & Society, vol. 2, 1 (2000) 39-69―, and Gilbert’s plu-
ral subjects (Michael E. Bratman, op. cit., §§ 5-8). Bratman insists that his shared intentions 
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tion is singular, not compound ―i. e. it is not built up out of other individual 
mental states. The non-reducibility of the intentional or mental state itself 
does not have to preclude the participation of others whatsoever. With re-
spect to conditions for realization of action, shared intentions, and perhaps 
other species of collective intentions more generally, are not satisfied simply 
on the grounds that the activity itself is engaged in by a plurality of individ-
ual subjects. Rather, those implicated and involved must share a proper 
intentional stance towards the intended action in order for the fulfillment of 
that intention. The evidentiary action(s) relative to the content specified by 
a collective intention is reducible to the actions of individuals30.  
It is in virtue of the claim that collective intentions are decomposable or 
reduceable to the intentions of individuals that Schmid understands formal 
individualism to be a reductive thesis31. Formal individualism offers a reduc-
tive explanation for collective behaviors on the basis of a bias against col-
lectivity. More to the point, it is committed to the position that all inten-
tional states are in the first-person singular. That simply does not match 
experience; the experience of the first-person plural is both genuine and 
non-trivial. Granted, formal individualists would argue that they are not de-
nying the phenomenology, but asserting that on analysis these types of ex-
periences can be accounted for as sets of singularly stated intentions. But 
as a phenomenologist, I ask what basis the formal individualist has for this 
revision? If the more basic phenomena in question that the formal individu-
alist points to is that all experience is someone’s experience, I fail to see 
                                                 
are of a narrower focus than either Searle or Tuomela’s objects of concern, which do not 
involve distinguishing between an individual’s intention for a group’s activity and an individ-
ual’s intention for shared activity (cfr. p. 116, n17, and p. 145, n6). I have no objection to 
Bratman’s distinction. However, I would suggest that his shared intentions be viewed as a 
species of collective intentions. The success conditions are more stringent, but what goes 
more generally for collective- or we-intentions follows with respect for shared intentions. I 
understand such a distinction in the following manner. The object of a shared intention is 
shared cooperative activity. The object of a collective intention is collective activity. I view 
shared cooperative activity as a species of collective activity. 
30 Leo Zaibert has argued that Searle is committed to formal individualism in virtue of 
his taking both a non-summative approach to collective intentionality and his subjective indi-
vidualism. (Leo A. Zaibert, “Collective Intentions and Collective Intentionality”, in David 
Koepsell / Laurence S. Moss (eds.), John Searle’s Ideas About Social Reality: Extensions, 
Criticisms and Reconstructions, Oxford, Blackwell, 2003, pp. 209-232). I don’t see why that 
would have to be the case, but cannot here respond to Zaibert’s argument in full. 
31 Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?”, p. 212; Idem, “Ra-
tionalizing Coordination: Towards a Stronger Conception of Collective Intentionality”, pp. 18, 
19, 21. 
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why that commits one to formal individualism ―pointing to Searle and phe-
nomenological philosophy as counter-examples32. Again, why would all ex-
perience or action be reducible to the singular form, especially if one finds 
oneself operating in plural contexts throughout one’s life? I agree with 
Schmid that collective intentionality, plural subject experiences and actions, 
should not be reductively construed. 
There is precedent for rejecting formal individualism in early phenome-
nology. Aron Gurwitsch roundly criticizes traditional ways of describing our 
experiences of others, whereby those experiences become philosophically 
problematic. In response to the philosophical motivations to recognize a 
problem of other minds framed in terms of access, Gurwitsch rejects formal 
individualism. The problem for formal individualism is that it conflates the 
singularity inherent in consciousness’ always being someone’s, the mine-
ness of experience, with consciousness’ being singular in the form of its in-
tentional act: “As a result, however, the ‘mental processes appertinent to 
We’ [‘Wir-Erlebnisse’] become unintelligible”33. Gurwitsch offers the follow-
ing alternative:  
Included in the sense of every mental process, in the effecting of which 
we know judgmentally, let us say, that other people also effect similar 
mental processes, there is also the co-presence of those others which 
is co-apprehended through the “we” (and, more particularly, co-
apprehended as effecting these mental processes together with me). 
On the basis of the immanental co-presence of others pertaining to the 
sense of these mental processes ―others together with whom I effect 
the mental processes in question― these mental processes are deter-
mined specifically as ours and are distinguished from those that are 
specifically mine.34 
And subjective individualism is not in jeopardy in that “the ego is a con-
stitutive moment in each mental process as mental process, [thus] it is then 
impossible that other people should effect the identically same mental proc-
ess as I do”35. Since consciousness is always an individual’s, and essentially 
                                                 
32 See n.30 on Leo Zaibert, op. cit., for example.  
33 Aron Gurwitsch, Human Encounters in the Social World. Pittsburgh-PA, Duquesne Uni-
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so, there is not identity between the acts with others, but with the contents 
as intended in some fashion or other. 
Diagnosing the problem with traditional approaches to our experiences 
of others, Gurwitsch notes that a major contributing factor to how philoso-
phy has erred so consistently is it has traditionally carried an operating as-
sumption that all meaning is homogeneous, primarily ―I add― through how 
we think about propositions. Gurwitsch suggests: “We should rather ask if 
human encounters have indeed many different senses, if they do not occur, 
as it were, in many different dimensions and that the sense of a particular 
human encounter is determined according to that dimension in which it 
happens”36. His answer is affirmative. “Human encounter” is a very general 
category, as such it is not terribly informative, but nor is it terribly restric-
tive in terms of its possible fulfillments. There is a plentifully variegated set 
of experiential kinds and modes operating under this heading, not a singu-
larity. Put another way, there are an indeterminate number of acts of con-
sciousness and contents of consciousness that could be paired in the range 
of human experiences. The language of plural subjects and collective inten-
tionality attempts to offer some general framework for speaking about that 
range of experiences. 
Returning to Schmid’s arguments, Schmid believes that subjective indi-
vidualists miss something crucial by leaving open the possibility for envat-
ted brains to have collective intentions. Schmid claims that even if shared-
ness is part of the content of an envatted brain’s experience, it is not a 
shared experience. “It is obvious (and trivially true) that the sharedness of 
intentionality is not a matter of the form or content of one single individual’s 
intentionality alone”37. Instead, Schmid claims that “in order for (we-) in-
tentionality to be shared, all participants have to have the appropriate (we-) 
intentions”38. Schmid believes that a certain palpable relation must hold in 
fact in order that there really be shared intentions39. As argued above, it is 
not necessary for there to be experience, that reality be how one is experi-
                                                 
36 ibidem: 33. 
37 Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?”, p. 209. 
38 Ibidem, p. 210. 
39 Ibidem, p. 211. 
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encing in advance or even at all, i. e. satisfaction conditions for evidencing 
an intentional content need not be met before an experience have sense, as 
opposed to the satisfaction conditions’ being determined by the sense in 
question. Schmid appears to invert the order of intentional constitution and 
intentional fulfillment in evidence.  
The possibility one could be in error or fail to fulfill one’s collective inten-
tion is consistent with a characteristic of intentionality as such. In cases of 
collectively pursued actions, intentions are not always realized through ac-
tion, for example winning a baseball game. The intention to act itself is for-
mulated before action, not as a result of action. Otherwise, it would always 
be correct to say of a losing sports team that they intended to lose. That 
represents a clear problem in explaining action. This is a far greater prob-
lem than if they intended to win and failed to bring to evidence their in-
tended goal. If satisfaction conditions like an action’s actually happening 
serve as genuine pre-conditions for intentionality and not the other way 
around, as Schmid’s and Anthony Meijers’ views appear to require, genu-
inely collective actions would be impossible40. If true, collective actions 
would require a prior collective intention that could not be formed without 
the world’s already matching its form and content. Fiction, dreams, memo-
ries and anticipations could never involve intentions inclusive of others, 
given the lack of a real-world relation. Watson and Holmes could never 
solve a case together. Don Quixote and Sancho Panza could never set out 
for adventure together. One could never imagine or dream about going on 
vacation together with others. Even the very protentive intentions constitu-
tive in temporally extended experience would be impossible, given the fu-
ture’s inexistence. Instead of requiring prefigured relations as a necessary 
condition for collective intentions themselves, one can appeal to a shared 
experiential basis as grounding phenomena for intentionality in the we-
mode. The sense of we or our or together requires some commonality at its 
basis, but that commonality is what’s necessary for the sense bestowal con-
                                                 
40 Cfr. Anthonie W. M. Meijers, “Can Collective Intentionality Be Individualized?”, in 
David Koepsell / Laurence S. Moss (eds.), John Searle’s Ideas About Social Reality: Exten-
sions, Criticisms and Reconstructions, Oxford, Blackwell, 2003, pp. 167-183. 
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stitutive of a plural subject not what is intended of or in relation to that plu-
ral subject as Schmid and Meijers believe. 
In order to better understand how the intention itself is not affected, 
one can turn to a distinction made by David Woodruff Smith between an 
intentional character and intentional relation. The intentional character is 
the correlation between the content intended and the subject’s intending. 
The intentional relation is the relation between the object intended and the 
content intended41. The former is an epistemic relation, the latter an onto-
logical relation. The content of one’s intentions can fail to correlate to an 
object. That is, there is no object standing in relation to the content of the 
subject’s intentional act so as to fulfill the intention, i. e. evidence is lacking. 
What’s more, one can emptily intend what is not present. For instance, I 
can now direct my thoughts towards a unicorn. That intention is of some-
thing, namely the content “unicorn” which has a sense, but fails to repre-
sent any real object in the world. Error, then, can occur when a subject 
forms a judgment, the underlying intentional content of which has no object 
in correlation. The same applies in relation to collective intentions. For in-
stance, one could intend that we all flap our arms and fly to Australia to 
have tea with the Queen of England. That is in the form of a collective in-
tention, but its content represents an impossibility (our flying without tech-
nological aid) and an implausibility (our having tea with the Queen of Eng-
land in Australia). Simply because the object intended is not satisfiable does 
not change that the content of the intention is of a specific sort ―an inten-
tion for collective action. Critics of subjective individualism, like Schmid and 
Meijers, conflate intentional character and intentional relation, attempting to 
reduce the former into the latter. They do so by counting the collective in-
tentional domain in terms of its object, through counting intentional con-
tents as dependent on the objects in question. But, socially constituted ob-
jects are constituted by the very contents in question. With emphasis on the 
object, they thus consider the subject’s act of intending in relation to what 
is in the world and not the content manifest in consciousness. As such, the 
role of the individual is effectively nullified, given the emphasis on the onto-
                                                 
41 David Woodruff Smith, The Circle of Acquaintance, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1989, § 3. 3. 
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logical relations, where the epistemic relations are determined in lieu of the 
ontology. The mistake lies in that social objects get their being through the 
epistemic relations. In other words, since epistemic relations intersubjec-
tively extended constitute social objects, it is erroneous to count those as 
posterior to that which they constitute.  
Regarding the first concern of Schmid’s noted above, he states: “Collec-
tive intentions, however, are not intentions of the kind anybody has for her-
self ―not single individuals, and not some group mind. Rather, it is some-
thing individuals share”42. I am sympathetic to Schmid’s refusal to under-
stand intentional acts as being like paper in a wastebasket: being located 
“in” something. However, the question of an intentional act’s spatial location 
amounts to a category mistake. When one refers to a spatial location at all, 
for example neurological events in one’s brain, one is changing the subject 
matter. Even if identity theories of mind are true, this holds: qua intentional 
act, it is nonsense to speak in spatial terms, even if qua neurological corre-
late there is sense to asking, in rough terms, about spatial extension and 
location. Schmid is wrong to think that intentional acts could happen with-
out a subject. While he is correct that the strong form of a ‘we’ intends 
something shared, Schmid is collapsing the distinction between the inten-
tional content and its conditions for satisfaction. He’s collapsing what is in-
tended with its correlate in the world. Doing so has the absurd effect of 
eliminating the possibility of any person’s ever being mistaken about what is 
shared.  
If Søren thinks to himself: “we are going to the zoo” where “we” ranges 
over himself, his parents and his teddy bear, Søren’s not failing to have a 
collective intention because either a) his teddy bear can’t have intentions or 
b) his parents have not formed any intention regarding the family’s going to 
the zoo together. Søren can project forth something that is not yet actually 
shared, but which is potentially shared. Searle rebukes non-subjectively-
individualist theories on the ground that they have trouble accounting for 
motivations pertaining to an individual’s action. Here one sees, on the one 
hand, that Søren’s intention could be used by him as a motivator to get his 
                                                 
42 Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Rationalizing Coordination: Towards a Stronger Conception 
of Collective Intentionality”, p. 20. 
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parents to conform their plans regarding the day’s activities to his. More to 
the point, however, Søren’s intentional state alone doesn’t in any clear way 
direct his parents’ motivations. Anyone who’s ever been around children can 
attest to the fact that children and parents often have divergent intentions 
regarding the family’s plans for a given day(s). To say they are intending 
what the family does, that the individuals involved don’t have collective in-
tentions, leaves us with a very commonplace phenomena now being need-
lessly perplexing. Similar behavior appears to underlie many political cam-
paigns. When a campaign states “we will win the election” they aren’t failing 
to identify a shared expectation just because the voters have not yet de-
termined the fact of the matter regarding the electoral results. Political 
campaigns seem to operate on the notion that confidence in projection of 
the potentiality concerning their victory is part of what comes to constitute 
the basis for the eventual actuality. That’s probably part of why one rarely 
sees a political candidate or their campaign say, “I think we might win in 
November” or “with a bit of luck I might just win this contest”. 
Turning to Schmid’s second concern, that social normativity cannot be 
adequately accounted for on a subjective individualist view of collective in-
tentionality, Schmid specifically targets Searle’s view as being “normativity 
free”. Schmid prefers to think that: “If the sharedness of intentionality is 
not necessarily in itself socially normative, it has socially normative conse-
quences”43. I agree with Schmid that collective intentions can have socially 
normative consequences, as does Searle actually. For instance, Searle 
speaks clearly about the deontic powers of collective intentional achieve-
ments when they coalesce to found institutional facts throughout his writ-
ings on social reality44. Searle’s classic work on “How to Derive ‘Ought’ From 
                                                 
43 Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?”, p. 213. 
44 In a paper published online, Leo Zaibert and Barry Smith insightfully argue that it is 
common in contemporary philosophy to speak of normativity as a homogenous whole and 
that this is clearly inadequate (http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/ Normativity.pdf). 
Zaibert and Smith find at least three kinds of normativity (labels mine): 1) Rule normativity 
– normativity derived from constitutive rules; 2) Grounding normativity – normativity which 
is necessary as a pretext to the possibility for social action; 3) Phenomenological normativity 
– normativity dependent on the essential structures of mental phenomena (Leo Zaibert / 
Barry Smith, op. cit., p. 17) In particular, I find the third category interesting, as the later 
Husserl began to give explicit treatment to such “proto-normativity” constitutive in the struc-
ture of experience (cfr. Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Ge-
nealogy of Logic, Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1973. Revised and edited by 
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‘Is’” demonstrates fairly straightforwardly, for instance, how the act of ut-
tering a promise generates a norm by which one’s success or failure to keep 
one’s promise can be evaluated45. Arguably what Searle is engaging in, in 
his work on social ontology, is assessing further how human acts generate 
normative structures and norms. Indeed, in that classic essay, Searle intro-
duces the notions of institutional facts and constitutive rules, both key ele-
ments of his recent works46. Specifically, Searle points out that there is not 
merely one kind of descriptive statement, counting at least the classically 
paradigmatic empirical descriptive statements and those that are indexed to 
some supporting fact of human institutions.  
Though both kinds of statements state matters of fact, the statements 
containing words such as “married”, ‘”promise”, “home run”, and “five dol-
lars” state facts whose existence presupposes certain institutions: a man 
has five dollars, given the institution of money. Take away the institution 
and all he has is a rectangular bit of paper with green ink on it47. 
 
What Schmid presents one with are two false dilemmas. Schmid’s first 
false choice is that one must either choose to deny an adequate view of so-
cial normativity or deny subjective individualism. If this is a genuine choice, 
then it would seem that we would have to rule against the majority of phi-
losophy and human history on the subject matter, many of the great phi-
losophical thinkers, not the least of which includes Plato and Aristotle, suc-
ceed in both presenting subjectively individualistic theories and accounting 
for social normativity. Normativity can arise out of intentional relations ex-
tended intersubjectively, and indeed there are such cases of codified nor-
mative systems such as law or institutional rule48. Schmid’s second false 
choice originates where he claims that accepting subjective individualism 
requires denying the relational nature of collective intentionality. It seems 
                                                 
Ludwig Landgrebe; translation by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks; and Idem, The Crisis 
of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston-IL, Northwestern 
University Press, 1970. Translation by David Carr). 
45 Cfr. John R. Searle, “How to Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is’”, The Philosophical Review, vol. 
73,1 (1964) 43-58. 
46 Cfr. ibidem, § III. 
47 Ibidem, p. 54. 
48 Idem. 
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plausible to assume that for Schmid, the former disjunct is motivated by the 
latter. Yet, implicating others in one’s intentional life, through the “we” form 
of intention, seems to rather clearly and expressly reference one’s related-
ness to others.  
In speaking of this second concern, Schmid again appeals to the forced 
spatial metaphor of tradition: “Collective intentions are not intentions of the 
kind anybody ‘has’ ―not single individuals, and not some super-agent. For 
collective intentionality is not subjective. It is relational”49. While I agree 
with Schmid that no super-agent is necessary and that collective intention-
ality is not merely subjective in the sense of being whatever an individual 
wants it to be, Schmid evades offering an argument as to why being rela-
tional means not being subjectively individualist, i. e. why relationality im-
plies that collective intentional states are not states of consciousness. I can 
understand wanting to avoid reifying or hypostatizing intersubjective rela-
tions or reducing all reality to predicates and subjects. One can further ap-
preciate the desire to emphasize the dynamic nature of our inter-
relatedness with one another. However, one mustn’t forget the simple point 
that relations require relata. There are no free-floating relations. One 
doesn’t need to assume that one’s relata are static in nature. If, for in-
stance, one’s subjects-in-relation with one another are dynamic beings, it 
only would figure that the nature of their relations would be fluid and dy-
namic as well. Schmid, like many contemporary reactionaries to the Modern 
philosophical tradition, over plays his hand. “Subject” does not entail 
“static”, “without relation”, or “essentially preconfigured in toto”, such that 
relations become superfluous or non-essential to our ontology, or whatever 
Modern conclusion Schmid seeks to draw regarding the nature of subjectiv-
ity.  
To say from the first-personal orientation of phenomenological inquiry 
“that a community is primarily or essentially an intentional subject is to say 
that, whatever else it might be, it exists primarily through its intentional 
properties ―its experiences and actions― which gives its the character of 
                                                 
49 Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?”, p. 214. 
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being of”50. This is to say plural subjects, or communities, embody orienta-
tions to the world, things in the world, and other communities and individu-
als in the world as well. In short, communities might be understood as 
communally held sets of comportments. Crucially, however,  
to use the third-person “it” in such descriptions is highly artificial and 
misleading. Better to say: for any such community of which I am a mem-
ber, it is we who experience, believe, feel and act; it is in and through such 
intentional relations, and through the narrational form of reflection and self-
constitution… that we exist and maintain our existence as a community51. 
 
Following which Carr denies making any ontological commitments as to 
the status of the community itself, a view we turn critically to shortly. Key 
to my purposes here is that Carr is asserting that communities, plural sub-
jects, are intentional achievements of the individuals who compose them, 
and which in turn affect and inform their members’ perceptions or actions. 
“As a world they make up not a collection of objects and objective relations 
but a complex of meaning which is not detachable from the community in-
tentionality which constitutes it”52. Even if a plural subject has an independ-
ent set of characteristics that are not reducible to those of their individual 
members, there is no plural subject independent of those members. To clar-
ify: plural subjects are ontologically dependent on individuals, as conscious, 
beings capable of setting up a world, and imbuing intentionality in a derived 
form beyond themselves ―e. g. through the formation of symbols, lan-
guage, artworks, etc. However, it is not the case that what is true of the 
plural subject can be distributed across its members. Plural subjects thus 
have some measure of independence from their constituent members. And, 
as Carr cautions, even if an analogy is available to the independence of the 
members (subjectivities), it does not follow that the whole is of the same 
nature. That would be to succumb to the fallacy of composition.  
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Carr turns expressly against the notion of the “group mind” and Sartre’s 
example of storming the Bastille53. Carr charges those who reason to the 
notion of strong collectivity or a group as a consciousness in its own right 
with post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning54. He then denies that the Sar-
trean model is adequate as a paradigm of social reality, while not denying 
that such instances as Sartre describes might be real and dangerous55. Such 
views, he argues, fail “by abandoning and subverting the individual subjec-
tivity they take us from the I not to the we but simply to a putative large-
scale I”56. Instead, the position advocated here and in Carr is one that “is 
not opposed to the individuals who make it up but exists precisely by virtue 
of their acknowledgement of each other and their consciousness of the 
We”57. Groups are not subjectivities in their own right, but depend for their 
powers ―intentional or otherwise― on subjectivities proper. None of this 
means that they can’t have intentionality, only that ―as Searle would have 
it― the intentionality in question is derived and not intrinsic in nature. In-
deed, Carr suggests that this is more telling about how we ought to con-
sider individuals, less substantively, than groups as some scholars seem to 
emphasize58. 
Identifying the intentionality of plural subjects as an instance of derived 
intentionality and their sense of embodiment as the less robust sense of 
being dependent on physical parts doesn’t diminish the status or minimize 
the power of complex plural subjects formalized by conventional systems of 
intentional agreements or acceptances like corporations or nation-states, 
nor eliminate their bearing meanings whatsoever (a metaphorical sense is 
still sense)59. What it does is to clarify the conditions for fulfillment regard-
                                                 
53 Idem. Sartre’s example also figures importantly for Larry May’s treatment of groups 
(cfr. Larry May, The Morality of Groups. Notre Dame-IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 
1987). 






59 As one moves into these more formalized intentional systems one invokes and attrib-
utes deontic powers derived from the collective intentional achievements of those involved. 
Searle’s original account evoked constitutive rules (X counts as Y in context C) as the 
mechanism for this. More recently, Searle has revised his position somewhat. He now counts 
constitutive rules as types of performative declarative acts (by Declaration we create the Y 
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ing these subjects in a manner that is plausibly verifiable. Metaphorical 
senses have conditions for fulfillment that are complex, untidy, and that can 
mask their more direct descriptive elements in virtue of their distance and 
historical derivations from intrinsic intentionality.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, Schmid’s mistake is to count the experiences in question 
as necessary conditions for collective intentionality. However, it is collective 
intentionality that is necessary to those experiences, not the reverse. 
Schmid would be correct in identifying plural subject experiences as suffi-
cient conditions for the presence of collective intentionality. Even if collec-
tive intentionality ranges over a plurality of subjects, one need not radically 
revise the nature of intentionality to account for that characteristic. Rather, 
the important point is that collective intentions attribute meanings to non-
arbitrary collectives of subjects. And, those collectives of subjects might 
have derived capacities in virtue of the collective intentionality of their 
shared endeavors. 
                                                 
status function), and that it is the declarative act that is the more basic species of intentional 
act pertinent to these powers (John R. Searle, Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, Addendum to Chapter 2, pp. 48-51). This is 
clearly a response to the vast set of criticism surrounding constitutive rules since Searle’s 
original formulation of his social ontology. Whether or not this adjustment satisfies his critics 
or not remains to be seen, though I suspect it only pushes any problems back a step. How-
ever, my own feeling is that Searle is aiming at a generally correct type of approach despite 
potential shortcomings. 
